There’s a famous definition of insanity: repeating the same behavior over and over and expecting a different outcome. Â That’s Somalia policy these days.
The African Union’s (AU) heads of state met last week last week in Kampala, where 76 people died in Somalia-linked bombings on July 11. Â They endorsed the policy that has failed for years, increasing the scale by adding 2000 or maybe 4000 troops. Â If you believe that only Americans think that more is always better, think again. The US did its part by agreeing to put up more money.
There was one holdout. Â Eritrea, represented by its foreign minister and returning to international meetings after its self-imposed boycott, opposed sending more troops. Â It also opposed the AU decision to let the troops be more aggressive. Â Until now, they have been limited to being ‘peace keepers’, though there is no peace to keep. Â The AU wanted them to be ‘peace makers’. Â The difference is that peace makers can shoot first but peace keepers have to be shot at first. The UN agreed with Eritrea and persuaded the AU to withhold the ’shoot first’ authorization.
It’s ironic that Eritrea, which has refused to talk to its own enemies for years, is the one pushing for dialogue. Â Eritrea has rejected talk with Ethiopia for the past seven years, refused until recently to talk to Djibouti after starting a border clash, won’t accept the credentials of the US ambasssador, etc.
The US tried to use force in Somalia in the 1990s and ended up with ‘Blackhawk Down”. Â UN blue helmets from Pakistan suffered even more deaths that same year. Â Ethiopia invaded in 2006 and withdrew a few years later after achieving little to show but casualties. Now it sends in troops for short incursions with limited goals. Â If the AU increase materializes, it will have 8000 or more troops in Somalia — the main effect of which will be to increase the casualties among both the troops and Somali civilians. Â Soldiers coming back in body bags are starting to chill public support in their home countries.
An alternative idea known as ‘constructive disengagement’ is becoming fashionable, an impressive label for a flimsy concept.  If  ’disengagement’ means ending the current failed policy, it could have merit.  As for ‘constructive’…well, it’s not clear what that means in practice.  Humanitarian aid would continue and humanitarian aid workers protected.  So far, so good, though that’s no change.
What would be new is the withdrawal of all foreign troops, though occasional interventions  (e.g. drone attacks or other raids) are not ruled out.  A big change would be opening a dialogue with Al Shabaab and other Islamists, something that Eritrea also urges. Eritrea is a reformed (apparently) supporter of some Islamists, with whom it has presumably been talking all along, though probably not about ending the fighting.  What these proposed new ‘constructive’ conversations might be about isn’t clear.
How dialogue differs from simply capitulating to the Islamists also isn’t clear. The Islamists would have even less incentive to relax their grip. On the other hand, fighting the Islamists obviously isn’t working. Â The new theory is that Al Shabaab, the dominant Islamist group, is so riven with factions and rivalries that only the presence of foreign fighters…Ethiopians, AU troops, raids by Americans drones and missiles…has kept them united. Â Without a common enemy, Al Shabaab would disintegrate into squabbling rivals, or weakened enough for local warlords to chip away at their turf.
It’s possible that Al Shabaab will not survive, with or without ‘constructive disengagement’.  Power struggles among the Islamists are no secret. Al Shabaab is widely hated for banning the World Cup on television, hacking off arms and legs of accused thieves, stoning rape victims for the crime of adultery and other un-Somali but fundamentalist excesses.  Traditional  Somali Islam is not Al Qaeda Islam. Also, Al Shabaab now hosts hundreds of foreign jihadi Islamists, making them vulnerable to Somali antagonism toward outsiders meddling in local disputes.
But ‘constructive disengagement’ confuses the possible collapse of Al Shabaab with the restoration of civil order. Â For most of the past nineteen years there was no Al Shabaab and no order. Â Instead, there was rule by local strongmen, gangsters and extortionists, some along clan lines, some not. But in some local areas traditional leaders and institutions maintained surprisingly effective rule. locally.
There was no ambition to create a national government until the short-lived Islamic Courts in 2006, who brought welcome civil order before they took fundamentalism too far for most Somalis, and absurdly threatened to take the Ogaden from Ethiopia. When Ethiopia invaded, it has now been forgotten, many Somalis greeted them with enthusiasm for ridding Mogadishu of the tyrannical clerics. Few defended the Islamic Courts. If only Ethiopia had left at the end of the week, instead of staying for more than two years….
‘Normal’ countries can’t seem to tolerate anything but a recognizable state, even one like North Korea. Anything else is a ‘failed state’. Â The possibility that Somalia might be better off, at least for now, without a central government, with local authority for now in the hands of trusted local leaders and familiar institutional forms, is beyond their imagining.
A few analysts have suggested that this might be more effective than supporting the illusory Transitional Federal Government on one hand, or abandoning Somalia to either Al Shabaab or the vacuum of its collapse on the other. Â This approach is also short on specifics, but at least it promises something to build on, which is better than than waiting for Al Shabaab to collapse and praying that what follows isn’t even worse.
So…what to do about Somalia? Â African heads of state are clueless. Â Europe and the US are equally clueless. Â Too many people without a grasp of the reality of Somalia are writing papers for each other. In the meantime, the danger appears to be spreading. Â The bombs in Uganda may not be the last. Â American and other nations’ Somali immigrants have already been recruited by the Islamists. Â Doing nothing is not an option.
2 Comments So Far»
First a correction about Eritrea refusing to talk to Ethiopia for 7 years and then a comment on Somalia.
The border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia ended with an African Union and UN and US supported cease fire with both parties agreeing to submit the border dispute to final and binding arbitration. Briefly, after a hearing at The Hague, before an impartial tribunal, in which both countries fully presented their cases, complete with maps, historical documents, etc., the Tribunal determined the border to be about where Eritrea said it was, with a few minor territorial changes with some land going to Eritrea and some to Ethiopia. Ethiopia never accepted the Tribunal’s award and the U.S., to it shame, never enforced the principle of international law that final and binding arbitration means just that. Eritrea’s refusal to talk with Ethiopia was based on the principle that first, Ethiopia must accept the Tribunal’s decision on the border demarcation. Then, Eritrea and Ethiopia can talk about anything else.
As for Eritrea’s dispute with Djibouti, my understanding is that both countries have agreed to submit to final and binding arbitration by a neutral arbitrator, with the arbitration process to be paid for by a Middle Eastern country.
Finally, Eritrea and Yemen did fight a war over a few islands in the Red Sea claimed by both nations. That dispute was submitted to final and binding arbitration, the decision went against Eritrea and it accepted it. So, despite the propaganda against Eritrea it has submitted all of its border disputes to final and binding arbitration.
Now as to Somalia, those of us familiar with the country have to stop using the name Somalia for the entire country.It is no longer a unified country and the situation in Mog and the south is entirely different that the status on the ground in Puntland and Somaliland. Again, briefly, Puntland has been relatively peaceful for the last decade and Al Shabaab is not present in the region. Somaliland recently held a fair, democratic election in which the incumbent lost and there was a peaceful transition. Al Shabaab holds sway in the southern part of the country and of course is fighting for control of Mog.
Constructive disengagement could be a meaningful policy if it means that the US and others will provide economic aid and infrastructure building assistance to Puntland and Somaliland(leaving aside the question of recognition). The message to the elders and leaders of those areas where Al Shabaab is present would be - reject Al Shabaab, establish some form of popularly supported government and you too will be eligible for economic assistance. This will help the Somalis to build from the local and regional levels to a national government, in a form and with the powers that Somalis themselves will decide. The US has to get away from the failed policy of trying to establish a strong national government in the capital. It hasn’t worked in Iraq, it is not working in Afghanistan so why should it succeed in Somalia?
Thanks for your thoughtful comments. We don’t differ materially.
The decision in The Hague seemed reasonable to me, at my distance. Eritrea got a proper border realignment, though not everything it wanted. It was also charged with the responsibility for an incursion that led to the war, with its 70,000 or more combat deaths. I leave it for others to decide whether Ethiopia or Eritrea behaved better. In my opinion, both have hands drenched in blood.
Ethiopia’s refusal to agree to the demarcation of the border despite an internationally binding agreement to do so is a lasting (but probably cost-free) disgrace. As you said, the US was a co-conspiritor, prefering to have Meles as a soldier in the War on Terror than in enforcing international law or caring about the behavior of its allies. (This, also, is not a first in history, and Eritrea can’t take much pride in its own allies.) But it is time to hold the EU, UN and AU responsible for letting Ethiopia get away with it. There were four guarantors, not just one, as it is so customary to say. The other three are equally culpable. No one spoke up for Eritrea, except those who had transparent motives that had nothing to do with justice, fairness or legality.
Regarding Somalia, I agree that the old term doesn’t describe today’s reality. I support Somaliland’s return to its 5 days of independence in 1960. It has earned the right. As for Puntland…it is clearly not part of the rest of Somaliland but has not expressed an interest in complete independence. If Puntland chooses independence, who am I to say no?
The point of my column was really to comment on the vacuum in ideas for Mog and south. Eventually, a national government would serve the Somalis best, delivering education, health care, coastal protection, integrated infrastructure, a common currency, a recognized passport, etc. There is no institutional basis for such a government at the moment, but there is an urgent need for stability and government services. A way should be sought to introduce services while continuing to deliver humanitarian assistance. I don’t such broad progress emerging from anything promoted by the AU, the US, the EU or the UN or the vague alternatives suggested by most think tanks far away.
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